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ISSUES
This case raises two interrelated
questions: What is the appropriate
interpretation of the statutory
phrase "independent judgment" as
used in § 2(11) of the National
Labor Relations Act in defining
which individuals are supervisors;
and who has the burden of proving
that an employee meets the definition of supervisor?
FACTS
In early 1997, the Kentucky State
District Council of Carpenters
(hereinafter "the union") began an
organizing drive among the professional and nonprofessional employees-including rehabilitation counselors, registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses, rehabilitation
assistants, and recreational assistants-employed by Kentucky River
Community Care (hereinafter "the
employer"). The union eventually
won a representation election and
was certified by the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter "the
Board") as the bargaining representative for the employees in the

above-described bargaining unit.
The employer refused to bargain
with the union, however, claiming
that the bargaining unit was inappropriate under the National Labor
Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA")
because it included certain nurses
who were supervisory employees.
The employer asserted that these
nurses directed the work of other
employees and therefore met the
definition of "supervisor," which
includes individuals having the
authority responsibly to direct other
employees "if ... the exercise of
such authority ... requires the use of
independent judgment." NLRA §
2(11).
The Board held that the employer's
refusal to bargain with the union
violated § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
rejecting the employer's argument
that the work of these nurses
required the use of independent
judgment. The Board determined
that the nurses' work in directing
other employees regarding issues of

NLRB v

KENTUCKY

RIVER

COMMUNITY CARE, INC. ET AtL.

DOCKET NO. 99-1815
ARGUMENT DATE:

FEBRUARY 21, 2001
FROM: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

patient care involved the use of professional knowledge, which was not
the same as "independent judgment" within the meaning of §
2(11). Kentucky River Community
Care, 323 NLRB No. 209 (1977).
The employer filed a petition with
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
to review the Board's decision
regarding the supervisory status of
the nurses in question. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the Board's conclusion, holding that the Board's interpretation of "independent judgment" was not entitled to deference
and found that the nurses were
supervisors. Kentucky River Care
Community, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d
444 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Board asked the Supreme Court
to review the Sixth Circuit's decision, and the Court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari. 121
S.Ct. 27 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
In NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp., 511 U. S. 571
(1994) (hereinafter HCR), the Court
noted that several of the phrases
used in § 2(11) are ambiguous, such
as the phrase "independent judgment," so the Board "needs to be
given ample room to apply them to
different categories of employees."
Id. at 579. When statutory language
is ambiguous, the Supreme Court
has held that "the question for the
court is whether the [administrative] agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the
statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1995).
Therefore, the crux of the present
case revolves around the question of
whether or not the Board's interpretation of "independent judgment" is
a permissible construction of §
2(11) of the NLRA.

The Board argues that it has traditionally held that an employee's
exercise of ordinary professional
judgment in directing less skilled
employees does not amount to the
use of independent judgment.
Advising less experienced workers
how to deal with specific work problems involves technical judgment
based on the employee's professional training. This judgment is based
on learned skills, not significant
individual discretion beyond this
special learned competence.
The Board reasons that this interpretation is consistent with both the
text and legislative history of §
2(11). The purpose behind the
inclusion of the "independent judgment" requirement in defining
supervisory status was to differentiate between true supervisors and
employees with minor authority
over co-workers. Congress intended
to formulate a narrow exclusion
with the aim of identifying those
individuals vested with genuine
managerial prerogatives. The legislative history shows that Congress
understood the supervisory exclusion to apply to employees who did
not work at a trade but instead
supervised those who did, as
opposed to excluding skilled
employees who instruct and guide
other workers and who themselves
work at a trade.
The interpretation of ambiguous
terms often requires the agency
empowered to enforce the statute to
accommodate conflicting policies.
In this case the Board says that, in
arriving at its interpretation, it was
attempting to accommodate the policy favoring broad coverage of the
NLRA versus the policy of giving an
employer unfettered discretion over
its labor relations agents.
The Board's interpretation takes
into account the statute's express
inclusion of "professional" employ-

ees as employees who are entitled
to union representation. Congress
expressly indicated its understanding that professional employees
ordinarily direct the work of less
skilled colleagues and yet are still
entitled to be protected under the
coverage of the statute.
The Board contends that its interpretation is rational and consistent
with the language and the legislative
history of the NLRA and has been
consistently applied by the Board in
cases involving both the health-care
industry and in non-health-care settings. Therefore, its interpretation is
entitled to deference by the
reviewing courts and the Sixth
Circuit erred in rejecting the
Board's interpretation.
The employer responds that the
Board's distinction between "independent" judgment and "professional" judgment is merely an attempt
to revive the patient-care analysis
already expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in HCR. The HCR
case also involved a question concerning the supervisory status of
certain employees in the healthcare industry. The phrase at issue in
that case was whether a nurse's
authority was exercised "in the
interest of the employer," another
requirement under § 2(11) in order
for an employee to be considered a
supervisor. In HCR the Board had
argued that a nurse is not exercising
authority in the interest of the
employer if the exercise is incidental to the treatment of patients. The
Court rejected that argument, reasoning that the business of a healthcare institution is patient treatment
and therefore authority exercised in
relation to patient treatment is
exercised in the interest of the
employer. According to the employer, the Board's forced distinction
between professional judgment and
independent judgment in the
(Continled on Page 258)
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instant case is similarly flawed.
Independent judgment means that a
decision is based on the thought
processes of the individual rather
than on an outside force. Using professional judgment to direct other
employees on how to handle
patients requires the employee to
make decisions based on her own
thought processes.
Moreover, the employer argues, the
Board's false distinction between
independent and professional judgment will make it virtually impossible for a professional employee to
ever be considered a supervisor.
Last, the employer contends that
the Board's interpretation is also
flawed because it is based on a policy bias in favor of finding employers
liable for violating the NLRA, which
is not an appropriate basis for
choosing among competing statutory policies.
On the issue of who has the burden
of proving whether an employee
meets the definition of a supervisor,
howsoever that definition is interpreted, the Board treats a claim of
supervisory exclusion as an affirmative defense that must be proven by
the proponent of the exclusion. The
NLRA defines an employee as "any
employee ...
but shall not include ...
any individual employed as a supervisor." Section 2(2). The statutory
language frames the issue as an
exception to the general rule that an
employee is "any employee." A
basic tenet of statutory construction
holds that a party claiming the benefit of an exception to a generally
applicable rule bears the burden of
proving that the exception applies.
The employer argues that the Board
should have the burden of proving
that an employee is a supervisor
because as a matter of litigation theory, the burden of proof is on the
party alleging that a statute has

been violated. Here the Board is
arguing that the employer has
refused to bargain with the union in
violation of the statute. In order to
prove that such a refusal violates
the NLRA, the Board is required to
prove that the bargaining unit for
which the union was certified as the
representative is an appropriate bargaining unit. It is inappropriate to
include supervisors in a bargaining
unit. Thus, since the appropriateness of the bargaining unit is an element of the violation, the Board
bears the burden of proving that the
employees included in the unit are
not supervisors.
SIGNIFICANCE
A nondeferential standard of review
invites parties to routinely contest
Board decisions on supervisory status, which is a contested issue in
many representation cases.
Moreover, these determinations
involve highly fact-intensive situations concerning the specific tasks
and duties of the contested employees, not allowing for readily transferable results from one case to the
next. Nondeference, therefore,
would have the effect of prolonging
the representation process, undermining the statutory policy in favor
of peaceful and expeditious resolution of representation disputes. This
case provides a prime example of
such delay: The union was certified
as the bargaining representative on
April 7, 1997, and now, almost four
years later, the issue of representation is still not settled.
Nurses work under stressful conditions, often at low wages and with
high rates of injuries, conditions
that can often be ameliorated
through the collective bargaining
process. To interpret "independent
judgment" as including the use of
discretion based on professional
training could have the effect of
depriving many nurses of the right

to organize, since most nurses provide guidance to co-workers on
issues relating to patient treatment.
On the other hand, in view of both
the nursing shortage and the
increased cost pressures faced by
the health-care industry, employers
are increasingly depending on nursing staff not only to perform their
own professional duties but also to
supervise others in the performance
of their nursing duties. In order to
deliver quality care more efficiently,
health-care providers rely on their
nursing staff to ensure quality performance by other workers in providing patient care. It is vital that
these nurses' undivided loyalty rest
with the employer; placing them in
bargaining units with the employees
they supervise could lead to lax
oversight of health-care workers and
endanger the safety of the patients
under their care.
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